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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I~

THE MATTER OF:

The New and Used Motor
Vehicle Dealer's License,
DICK and LAVONNE NOREN, dba
Central R. V. Sales

Case No. 16521

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLANT ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
UTAH STATE 110TOR VEHICLE BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-17, WAS DISTINCT
FROM THE PURPOSE OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-35-17.5, AND SHOULD BE GIVEN A
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT APPLICATION AND
OPERATION.
Respondents' brief states that Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17
(hereinafter §77-35-17) is an "expungement" statute which is intended to restore "the criminal offender to his status quo ante
thereby removing all evidence and the very existence of the prior
conviction."

In partial support for this proposition, counsel

cites to the language used by Justice Maughn in State v. Chambers,
53 3 P . 2 d 8 7 6

(Utah 19 7 5) :

The word "expunge" properly describes a
phvsical act, not a legal one. However, in relati;n to 77-35-17, it has become fastened in our law
by decision and practice as descriptive.of what the
court can do under that statute.
In thls sense, lt
is expressive of councel,

revoke,

set aside.

533 P.2d at 878.
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Respondents continue by comparing Justice Maughn 1 s langu
in Chambers to that of various noted authorities in their descr:
tions of what effect expungement has on convicted parties 1 reco:
Respondents claim them to be identical.

But, a closer analysis

of these comparisons reveals a sharp contrast rather than a sirr.·
ilarity between the two.

Chambers and respondents

1

authorities

describe different events.
For their comparison, respondents cite the following def·
initions:

"the word expungement means to erase.

The purpose o'

expungement statutes is to erase a criminal record as if it nev;
happened in the first place,"
Kerper

&

Kerper

(1974);

Legal Rights of the Convicted,

"expunge" means "to obliterate or to rna:

void and of no effect," Expungement of Criminal Convictions in
Kansas: A Necessary Rehabilitative Tool,
"It is rather

13 Washburn L.H.,

93,~·

a process of erasing the legal event of a

conviction or adjudication," Goug'1, The :Cxpungement of Adjudica·
tion Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of Stat
19 6 6 vi ash. L. Q. 14 7, 14 9.

Appellant notes a distinction between these definitions
"expungement," cited to the court by respondents,
effect of §77-35-17.

and the actua

This distinction is demonstrated through

the choice of words selected by Justice Maughn in the majori~
opinion in Chambers.

In essence,

(the Utah Supreme Court)

the majority says that when•

use the word "expunge,"

it is expressive of cancel,

revoke,

set aside."

"in this sense
Chambers at 8'

The appellant suggests that the above language by the court v:ao
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in effect saying:

"Yes, we realize that §77-35-17 is often referred

to as an 'expungement' statute, for lack of a better short title,
but when this court uses the word

'expunge' in reference to

§77-35-17, it will only be 'expressive of cancel, revoke, set
aside.'"

Id. at 878.

The contrast between respondents' authorities and the
language of this court in Chambers, demonstrates that respondents
are defining a "pure" expungement situation for which §77-35-17.5
was created, whereas, §77-35-17, the statute under which respondents
proceeded, does something different and does not purport to apply
to a "pure" expungement situation.
Appellant's rationale is clearly borne out in Chambers
by the majority's language which precedes the above quoted passage:
These two statutes are mutually exclusive.
Section 77-35-17.5 does not purport to amend or
repeal 77-35-17.
It is apparent that each deals
with a different situation.

* * * *
The record shows a confusion of both statutes
in the initiation of this matter; .
. Proceeding
under this statute the court cannot seal the record,
restrict its inspection, nor bring into operation
circumstances which would allow a response to ininquiries relating to a conviction of crime, as
thouoh such conviction had never occurred.
The
court can terminate the sentence, set aside a defendant's plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss
the action, and discharge the defendant.
533 P.2d at 878 (emphasis added).
Clearly, the court recognized confusion in the application
o~

these two statutes and clarified that §77-35-17 was more limited

~~

scope in what type of relief a court may grant proceeding under

it.

In deciding Chambers, this court refrained from using those
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"common buzz words of

expungement" which respondents would ha•.

this court use in defining §77-35-17.

absen~

There is a clear

of such "buzz words" as "obliterate," "erase," and "as if it
never happened in the first place."
Respondents urge the court to return Mr. Noren "to his
status quo ante, thereby removing all evidence and the very exi
ence of the prior conviction," but, even respondents cite the
very language from Chambers which denies that this may happen
under §77-35-17:
Proceeding under this statute the court cannot
seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor bring
into operation circumstances which would allow
response to inquiries relating to a conviction of
crime, as though the conviction never occurred.
Chambers at 878 (emphasis added).
I£ an offender must always respond to inquiries pertaini
to his convictions, how can respondents contend that the purpo:
of the statute is to return Mr. Noren "to his status quo ante?"
Appellant suggests that a difference does exist between
the complete erasure and obliteration of an event and a mere cc
celling, revoking, or setting aside.

This difference is high-

lighted by the effect that each action has.
An erasure of an event would remove and,
purposes, render it nonexistent.

for practical

In this context,

(l)

an ex-fE

could respond in the negative to any inquiry as to prior con~c
tions;

(2) no party could testify as to his prior conviction;'

(3) no record would exist for public inspection.

On the other

hand, a revocation, cancellation or setting aside does not
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re~

the court-created and evidence-sustained record.

The written

record still exists and will always exist until erased by court
order.

There was no court-ordered erasure in the instant case.

In this context, an ex-felon with his record cancelled, set aside,
or revoked,
victions;

(1) does not have the privilege of denying prior con-

(2) other people with direct knowledge of the crimes

and convictions may reveal their knowledge; and (3) the record of
conviction is always open to public inspection at the appropriate
court clerk's office.

It is this latter effect which Justice

Maughn attributed to §77-35-17:

"Proceeding under this statute

the court cannot seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor
. allow a response to inquiries relating to a conviction of
crime, as though such conviction had never occurred."

Chambers,

supra.
The realities of the instant case reveal that Mr. Noren
proceeded under §77-35-17, and had his conviction set aside, but
has never received a court order allowing him to deny prior convictions, nor has there ever been a court order "sealing" his
record and effectively removing it from public knowledge and
inspection.

The current status of }tr. Noren's prior convictions

is that they are to this day unsealed, unerased, and available
:or public inspection through an inquiry at the clerk's office
of the Fifth Circuit Court at the Metropolitan Hall of Justice.
Appellant draws the court's attention to yet another argur:c:t v:hich appears in respondents' brief, but which differs from
~:c::>ellant's understanding of what this court has said in Chambers.
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Respondents use the following language:
[A]lthough the respondent herein, after
the expunging of his convictions under §77-35-17,
may not answer as he could under §77-35-17.5 that
he had never been convicted of the offenses in
question, he could nevertheless answer truthfully,
that although he had been convicted of the offenses,
that the convicting court had set aside the conviction, had dismissed the action and had discharged
him and that therefore his conviction(s) do not now
exist.
Respondents' brief at p.6 (emphasis added).
Appellant disagrees with the respondents' view that "theF
fore his conviction{s)

do not now exist."

To so proclaim

is~

deny the direct language, and intended operation of §77-35-17,,
defined by this court in Chambers and as earlier discussed in
appellant's brief,

supra.

Appellant submits that when §77-35-1-

dismisses, revokes, or sets aside, it is not the conviction itse.
but, rather,

~~e

effect of the conviction, or the sentence and

penalties involved therewith which are dismissed,
aside.

revoked, or sE·

Appellant further submits that if as discussed, supra, t'

record of convictions is

~ever

sealed, erased, or obliterated,'

each conviction will always be noted on the public records.

T~

effect of §77-35-17 is merely one of waiving or staying the

re~

of any sentence which was imposed by the court following a conviction.

This benefit usually comes to a party when the con-

viction is a first conviction and the conduct was not so egregic
that society needs to invoke some stricter form of retribution.
In these cases, completing a successful period of probation in
which no further convictions have occurred will be sufficient
invoke §77-35-17 and waive the remainder of the sentence.
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This distinction draws support from two separate sources.
First, the legislative titles of the two acts

(§§77-35-17 and

77-35-17.5) are entirely different and suggest separate public
policies, the latter being entitled, "Expungement of court records,"
and the former entitled,

"Suspension of sentence-Probation-Condi-

tions of probation-Power of court to dismiss or discharge defendant-Exceptions."
r;

The title of §77-35-17 indicates that the legislature
intended that the public policy to be attained by §77-35-17 is to
c.:

allow it to operate by staying the effects of a sentence, but not
of the conviction itself.

Whereas, the public policy intended by

the legislature to be attained under §77-35-17.5 is to free the

)E.

offender from future public dissemination of his conviction by
sealing all records pertaining thereto, and freeing him, thereby,
of all effects of the conviction.
Appellant recognizes that the court will usually refrain
from considering the titles to Acts when asked to interpret a
1E

statute, but appellant also recognizes that certain exceptions
Ti

are made to this practice when a certain degree of uncertainty
exists.

Appellant suggests the instant case contains this re-

quisite degree of uncertainty as explained in Great Salt Lake
ic

Authority v. Island Ranching, 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, Rehearinq,
18 Utah 2d 276, 421 P.2d 504

t

(1966), wher~ the court stated:

We are aware that in many decisions, includina our own, it has been stated that the title is
not pa;t of the act.
This is true in the sense that
it is not integrated into the operatlng portlon of
the legislation; and that it will not be permltted
to contradict or defeat a plainly expressed lntent;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nor can it be used to create an aQbiguity or uncertainty when the language of the body of the act is
clear.
But where such clarity is lacking it is
permissable to look to the title of the enactment
to shed light on and clarify the meaning.
414 P.2d
at 964-965 (emphasis added). (See also, Donahue v.
Warner Bros., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954);
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967);
American Smelting v. Utah State Tax Commission, 16
Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 67 (1966).)
If the court feels there is great ambiguity in the statutit may find the titles helpful.

Second, futher support is

fo~d

in the two California cases cited in appellant's original brief
hereinbefore filed with this court (In Re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d
55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941) and Meyer v. Board of Medical Examinen,
34 Cal.2d

62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949)).

In both cases, the peti·

tioners had been convicted of a criminal statute and sentenced,
but the execution of part of the sentences was suspended penilim
payment of fines and/or certain periods of probation.

In both

cases, petitioners complied with their probation conditions (or
were still in the process of so doing)

and petitioned their

respective courts to relieve them of further effects of the
sentence and probation.

In Phillips, the court set "aside the

verdict of guilty and dismissed the accusation."

at 345.

In

!1eyer, the court "ordered that his "probation be terminated anc
at 1086.

he be discharged therefrom .

Following these

judicial ilctions, both petitioners filed to remove the profess!
disbarments which had been based upon their prior convictions.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court refused to regrant the::
professional licenses stating that the "setting aside" or "dis·
charge" only stayed the execution of the sentences and did not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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remove the actual convictions.

The court in Phillips is especially

clear in outlining the distinction between §§77-35-17 and 77-35-17.5
alluded to by the appellant, supra:
It is contended that the order granting
probation followed by an order dismissing the
action..
is analogous to an order granting a
new trlal or to the reversal of a judgment of conviction upon appeal, and that a judgment of conviction cannot be final so long as the court can
set it aside by any of these methods.
But we do
not believe that the power granted to the trial
court can be given this effect .
No such
considerations are present in the granting of
probation to a convicted defendant. Whether the
court suspends the rendition of the judgment of
conviction or whether it merely suspends the
execution of the judgment, the order of probation
presupposes that the defendant is guilty.
109 P.2d at 347 (emphasis added).
It is important to note that the statutes involved in
Phillips and Meyer are sinilar to §77-35-17, which is being considered in the instant case.
Not only do these cases stand for the proposition that it
is only the execution of the sentence and not the conviction itself
which is waived but, they also stand for the proposition that professional licensing boards may still consider the conviction, even
2£ter a "discharge" or setting aside:
The powers possessed by the trial courts
under the Probation statutes .
. are concerned
with mitigation of punishment . . . . The power of
the court to reward a convicted defendant who
satisfactorily completes his period of p7obation
by settina aside the verd1ct and dlsmlsslng the
action operates to mitioate his pu~ishment by
restoring certain rights and remov1ng certaln
disabilities.
But it cannot be assumed that the
legislature intended that such action by the .
trial court . . . should be consldered as obllterating the fact that the defend2nt had been finally
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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adjudged auilty of a crime
. In brief,
action in mltigation of the defendant's punishment
should not affect the fact that his guilt as been
finally determined accordinq to law.
Such a final
determination of guilt is the basis for the order
of disbarment in this case.
That final judgment
of conviction is a fact; and its effect cannot be
nullified for the purpose here involved, either by
order of probation or by the later order dismissing
the action after judgment.
109 P.2d at 347 48
(emphasis added (see also Meyer at 1087).
The effect of this is shown by the difference between PrE·
conviction and post-conviction acquittals or dismissals.

A dis-

missal or acquittal made prior to conviction reflects the fact
that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden of proof and
either withdrew the complaint prior to trial or received a verdic:
of not guilty from the triers of fact at trial.

On the other hanc

a post-convictlon acquittal or dismissal is the type referred

~

in Phillips and Meyer and which is present in the instant case.
The effect of such an action would be to "mitigate" the offende''
"punishment."

But, it should not be interpreted as "obliterating

the fact that the defendant had been finally adjudged guilty ofo
crime."

It was on this basis that the Phillips court felt it

could not restore the professional license sought.

Appellant sugc

the facts of this case require similar treatment on the same bas:
This result is all the more demanded where professional
licenses are concerned because the very character of the party
involved is called into question, and where the offender was co::
victed of violating the very act which he will be called upon

~

enforce if a license is granted, then the character of the appl:
is very relevant to the applicant's fitness for the particular
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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license applied for and should be admissable at any stage of any
proceeding where the character of the applicant and the propriety
of issuing the license are in question.

To this same effect were

this court's guidelines in State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351,64 P.2d
229 (1936):
The following principles,
. are here
enumerated for the guidance of the bench and bar:

* * * *
(2)
Any witness may be asked a question
the answer to which has a direct tendency to degrade
his or her character if it is pertinent to establish
the ultimate fact in issue or to a fact from which
such fact may be presumed or inferred.
64 P.2d at 238
(emphasis added).
And in the Utah Judicial Code, §78-24-9:
A witness must answer questions legal and
pertinent to the matter in issue, . . . but he need
not give an answer .
. which will have a direct
tendency to degrade his character, unless it is to
the very fact in issue or to a fact from which the
fact in issue would be presumed. (Emphasis added.)
In this regard, it is important to note that one of the
main inquiries required of the Motor Vehicle Licensing Board, as
directed by the Motor Vehicle Code, is to ascertain and consider
the fitness of all applicants for dealership licenses.
Ann. §§41-3-8 and 41-3-26.

Utah Code

This calls into question the applicant's

character and requires him to reveal whether he has ever been convicted of a crime under the act which he may be required to enforce.
Respondents have attempted to distinguish Phillips and
~1eyer and to discount appellant's analysis by claiming that,

(1)

the statutes involved in those cases were "probation" statutes
c.r.d not "expungement" statutes;

(2) California now has a different
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statute than that which was litigated in Phillips and Meyer; ana
(3) Loder v. Municipal Court for S.D. Judicial District, 17 CaL
859, 553 P.2d 624

(1976), holds to the opposi-::.e effect of these

cases.
First, appellant agrees that the statutes involved

in~

and Phillips were probationary in nature, but the important thir.
to note is that these statutes are worded very similarly to
§77-35-17, making it also probationary in nature.

Ut~

This would

likewise appear to have been the intended legislative effect of
the statute based upon that section's title.

Appellant submits

that Utah's statute should be read as a Meyer- Phillips type
statute.
Second, the fact that California has enacted new legisla:
which has repealed the statutes under which Meyer and Phillips
were decided does not destroy the usefulness of these cases it
deciding the proper interpretation of similar legislation.
Nevada Supreme Court found both cases helpful in deciding
v. Nevada State Board of Accountancy,

93 Nev.

%e
~

548, 571 P.2d 105

(1977), where the Nevada Supreme court cited both Phillips and
~

as authority in holding that business and professional

licenses may be withheld on the basis of prior convictions, eve·
though the verdict has been "set aside" and "dismissed," folloh
u "satisfactory completion of probation."

571 P.2d at 106.

Finally, appellant submits that respondents'
Loder is misplaced here because that case dealt with

reliance~
expungem~

of arrest records of individuals, v;hich arrests never proceedes
trial or conviction.

The court allowed these records to be
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destroyed.

Respondents' citation of that court's remarks directed

at expungement of convictions was only dicta, which the same court
followed with these directive remarks:
Indeed, even a conviction can no longer
support a denial or revocation of a license unless
the crime is "substantially related to the qualifca
tions, functions or duties of the business or pro
fession in question.
553 P.2d at 635 (emphasis added).
The instant case is easily distinguishable because, as
noted in Phillips the "final judgment of conviction is a fact; and
its effects cannot be nullified for the purpose here involved,either
by order of probation or by the later order dismissing the action
after judgment."

109 P.2d at 349.

There is no reason to keep a record where there has been
only an arrest and no conviction, as in Loder, but there is ample
reason where a conviction resulted and sentence imposed.
Appellant suggests that following the rule established in
~,

Phillips and Patt, the fact that a party seeking a pro-

fessional or business license has had his conviction set aside or
dismissed should not affect a court or an administrative agency
from weighing that conviction, especially when the conviction
relates directly to the license applied for.

Where the offender's

record is not sealed, is open to public inspection, and where
the offender himself must acknowledge his convictions when confronted,

the court or agency must be able to consider this in-

fornation in making a "fitness" determination.
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POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY HEARING
THIS ~ffiTTER COMPLETELY DE NOVO, BY
EXCLUDI"G RESPONDENTS' PRIOR CONVICTIONS, AND BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
RECORD CREATED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY.
Appellant asserts that although the statute under which
respondents filed their appeal to the Third District Court is
arabi guo us and not de fined explicitly through case law, the inter·
pretation selected by the Third District Court was the least
desirable and least applicable of all possible interpretations.
Appellant suggests that there are at least three interpretations more viable than that selected, below, which encompas'
a "review" type of appeal which appellant believes is mandated.
(See appellant's reply brief at 17.)
Respondents cite State v.
1034

(1941)

and Hakki v.

Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114

Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132,

P.~

396 P.2d 876 (19f·

for the proposition that the "original action" required in Utar.
Code Ann.

§41-3-27, is synonomous with the invoking of the ori~

jurisdiction of the district court.

Appellant disputes this r~

ing of these cases as being too cursory and distinguishable hm
the instant setting.
First, we are dealing with a proce<?ding commenced in an
administrative agency as opposed to one commenced in a lower
judicial tribunal.

The legislature created these agencies and

granted them quasi-judic1al powers in order to create a body

1
::

expertise in the particular area and to avoid overburdening ti,,
courts with nonjudicial functions like licensing.

Therefore,:
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short because this court was not confronted in either case with
an "appeal" to the district court from a lower tribunal, nor did
they grapple with the state of the law when the facts were first
disputed at an administrative agency and then brought to the
district court.
Secondly, this case may be distinguished by the very language
and authority used in Johnson.

There, citing In Re Peterson's

Estate, 22 N.D. 480, 134 N.W. 751 (1912) at 763, it is suggested
that the legislature nay grant reviewing courts whatever power it
wishes, including some incidences of original jurisdiction:
The Legislature may require the appellate
court to review the facts and render final judgment.
If in so doing it exercise [sic] some of the functions of a court of original jurisdiction, we answer
that there is neither constitutional nor legal
reason why it should not.
114 P.2d at 1037.
In this regard, appellant suggests that for the Third
District Court to have original jurisdiction over this licensing
action, as submitted by respondents, then that court must have the
power to have originally heard the action without following the
administrative procedure created by statute.

In essence, what

respondents are contending is that the administrative agency is
similar to the old city court which was a court of limited jurisdiction, wherein any action commenced in that court could have
been equally commenced in the district court.
t~at

Appellant contends

this is a strained interpretation because the legislature

~as granted the licensing power,

not to the courts, but to its

statutorily created adninistrative agencies.

These agencies are

created as experts in their particular areas and are not similar
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to the city court system in this respect at all.

Unless

applic~

tion is made to an administrative agency and a hearing is held an
a record and decision entered, the district court may not enter
the field and become a licensing body.

Application may not

originally be made Lo the Third District Court to bypass the
administrative process.

(See, in this regard, Point II of appel-

lant's original brief, especially the discussion of U.S. v. Distr
Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132 (1951), and Peterson v. Livestoc
Commission, 120 Mont. 140, 181 P.2d 152 (1947) at pp. 9-14,
Appellant's Brief.)

Therefore, the contention that original act:

means precisely the same as original jurisdiction as expressed ii
Johnson and Faux is unfounded.
Appellant asserts that the legislature's choice of words
has determined that the courts are not to become licensing bodie:
They are to function as reviewers of the agency's actions on
11

appeal.

11

If anything but some form of review on the record was

intended by the legislature, then there would have been no need
to create such an elaborate process whereby judicial powers are
granted and a record created.

(See appellant's discussion of

this point in relation to Denver

&

R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Servic

Cornrn., 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552

(1940), and Denver & R.G.W.R. (

v. Central Weber Sevier Improvement District, 4 Utah 2d 105, 28:
P.2d 884

(1955) at pp. 14-16 of appellant's original brief.)

Appellant submits that the legislature created a requirement of
an appeal bond in a licensing case because it intended the dist:
court to review the administrator's decision.

The filing of~

original action was merely a means of invoking the jurisdictior
of
theby the
district
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Appellant suggests that the three most logical interpretations which could be given to the "appeal and original action"
requirement of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-26 are:
should have

The district court

(1) considered the case as a review of an administra-

tive agency, applying the applicable standards of review;

(2) held

a trial de novo in which the administrative agency's hearing
record was considered and additional evidence taken; and {3) sat
as the administrative agency applying the law appropriate thereto,
and sitting in a pure de novo hearing as the administrator.
Under any of these applications of the statute, the prior
convictions are admissible evidence and the mere setting aside
thereof could not operate so as to make them inadmissible in this
particular administrative setting.

Since the convictions are

admissible, the trial court committed error when it failed to
follow the specific mandate of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-8 and refuse
to issue a motor vehicle dealer's license because an applicant had
been convicted in a court of record of a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Dealers' Act.
In short, Mr. Noren has been convicted of such a violation
and only an expungement under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17.5 can ever
alter that fact.

In the absence of such an expungement, §41-3-8

calls for a denial of a license.
DATED this

/

sr-

day of }lay, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

111aJit;~·
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